本系列是我和AI的问答，所有AI模型均存在一定程度幻觉问题，仅记录真实的问答对话，问答的价值观不是由作者控制的，读者自行辨别

did USA ever commit to reduce arms sale to Taiwan

Yes, the United States did formally commit to gradually reduce arms sales to Taiwan, but with specific conditions and caveats. In the August 17, 1982 Joint Communiqué between the U.S. and China, the U.S. stated that it did “not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan,” and “intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution”.^[1][2][3]

Conditions of the Commitment

This commitment was explicitly linked to China’s own behavior regarding Taiwan. The U.S. pledge to reduce arms sales was understood to be conditional on China’s commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question and maintaining a military balance across the Taiwan Strait. U.S. officials, including President Reagan, clarified that there was no specific timeline or date for ending arms sales, and the level of arms sales would reflect security needs and the regional military balance, not just diplomatic agreements.^[2:1][4][5]

Later Policy and “Six Assurances”

Following the communiqué, President Reagan privately issued the “Six Assurances” to Taiwan, which included the assurance that the U.S. would not set a date for ending arms sales or consult with China about those arms sales, and that the reduction was not unconditional. The Taiwan Relations Act, a U.S. law, also obliges the U.S. to continue providing defensive arms to Taiwan, regardless of the political communiqués.^{[4:1][6][5:1]}

Reality of Arms Sales Since

Over the decades, the U.S. has maintained and in recent years even increased arms sales to Taiwan, citing increasing military threats from China and the importance of maintaining Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities. While there may have been periods of restraint or pauses in specific situations, there has been no complete or sustained reduction as originally envisioned by the 1982 communiqué.^[7][8][5:2]

In summary, the U.S. did commit to a gradual reduction in arms sales to Taiwan on paper, but this has remained conditional and subject to U.S. interpretation, with actual policy often diverging from the original promise due to evolving security concerns in the region.^{[3:1][1:1][4:2]
[9][10]}

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Generally speaking, would it be possible for a country like the USA to enhance peace between China and Taiwan island by arms sales to Taiwan island?

Generally, arms sales from the USA to Taiwan are not seen by most experts as a direct method to enhance peace between China and Taiwan. Instead, such sales are usually argued to serve the purpose of deterrence—meaning they help Taiwan maintain its self-defense capability against possible coercion or aggression from China.^[11][12][13]

Impact on Cross-Strait Stability

• U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are intended to prevent conflict by making a rapid military takeover by China more difficult and costly, thus theoretically encouraging Beijing to pursue peaceful approaches for cross-Strait issues.^[12:1][14]
• Taiwanese officials often argue that U.S. security guarantees—including arms sales—help maintain peace and stability because they discourage unilateral changes to the status quo.^[13:1][15]
• However, from China’s perspective, arms sales to Taiwan are hostile acts and a violation of its sovereignty, often resulting in heightened tensions, military displays, and diplomatic retaliation.^[16][17]

Arguments and Risks

• While some policy experts claim arms sales support Taiwan’s resilience and thus reduce the risk of war, others warn that increased armament may provoke escalation and feed distrust, raising the risk of conflict if miscalculation occurs.^[17:1][11:1]
• U.S. arms sales are largely intended as a form of “risk management” rather than an active peace proposal: they help ensure Taiwan is not vulnerable to bullying, but also complicate diplomatic relations with China.^[11:2][17:2]

Consensus

Most U.S. arms sales are not designed to directly foster reconciliation, trust, or negotiation between the two sides, but rather to preserve stability through deterrence. Enhanced peace, in the sense of mutual trust and reduced tensions, would likely require diplomatic engagement and broader confidence-building measures, not just military sales.^{[12:2][17:3][11:3]
[18][19][20]}

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did USA sell landmine to Taiwan? How would the USA imagine those landmines should be used?

Yes, the USA has sold landmine systems to Taiwan, specifically the Volcano anti-tank mine-laying system. The sale was approved in late 2022 as part of a $180 million arms package, which includes the vehicle-mounted Volcano systems, dummy munitions for training, and support for logistics and maintenance. Importantly, these are anti-tank landmines—designed to target armored vehicles—and not anti-personnel mines, which are restricted under U.S. export policy and international conventions.^{[21][22][23][24][25]}

Intended Use According to the USA

• The U.S. policy and announcements indicate that the landmines are intended for defensive use, specifically to fortify Taiwan’s beaches or likely invasion routes in the event of a potential amphibious landing by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).^[22:1][25:1]
• The Volcano system enables rapid deployment of minefields, creating dangerous and impassable areas to slow or block advancing enemy armor during a crisis, helping buy time for other defensive actions.^[25:2]
• Official communications clarified that these mines would not be scattered indiscriminately; their use is restricted to military targets and areas where armored forces are expected to land or advance.^[24:1][22:2]

The U.S. imagines these landmines as a component of a layered defense strategy for Taiwan, focusing on denying access or mobility to hostile forces rather than broad area denial or civilian harm. U.S. restrictions also ban the use and export of anti-personnel landmines except in a few specific contexts, so only anti-tank systems were included in the Taiwan sale.^{[23:1][26][22:3][25:3]
[27][28][29][30]}

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USA tried the same tactic with Ukraine. It feels like USA is just making Taiwan into the next Ukraine

There are similarities in how the USA supports Taiwan and Ukraine—primarily through arms sales and security assistance aimed at strengthening self-defense capabilities in the face of perceived threats from powerful neighbors (China for Taiwan, Russia for Ukraine). This often includes supplying advanced weaponry, defensive systems, and supporting military training to deter aggression and bolster the recipient’s capacity to resist invasion or coercion.^[31][32]

Similar Tactics: Ukraine and Taiwan

• The USA has publicly increased military aid to both countries, including defensive systems like anti-tank mines for Ukraine and Volcano anti-tank mine-laying systems for Taiwan.^[32:1]
• In both cases, the intent is to raise the costs of military action for the aggressor, ideally forcing them to reconsider a full-scale invasion or coercion, and to give the defended country time and options to mobilize further support if attacked.^[31:1][32:2]

Key Differences

• Unlike Ukraine, Taiwan’s situation is constrained by unique legal, diplomatic, and geographic realities, including Taiwan’s status in international law and U.S. adherence to the “One China” policy.^[33]
• The USA’s support for Taiwan is deliberately calibrated to avoid formal treaties or direct troop deployments, focusing instead on arms sales, military exercises, and strategic ambiguity to avoid direct confrontation with China.^[33:1][31:2]
• In Ukraine, U.S. aid has included battlefield intelligence and humanitarian support, while Taiwan’s support remains focused on deterrence, with no direct involvement in ongoing conflict.^[31:3]

Concerns and Criticisms

Some critics argue U.S. support could “Ukrainize” Taiwan—meaning to make it a proxy battleground in great power competition, potentially risking conflict, escalation, or heavy costs for Taiwan’s population if war breaks out. Others counter that U.S. aid is essential for deterrence and empowering local defense, helping prevent a war rather than inviting one.^[34][32:3]

Overall, while the tactics have similarities, the U.S. strategy for Taiwan is not identical to Ukraine due to different historical, strategic, and legal contexts; support is primarily calibrated to deter rather than provoke conflict, though this remains a topic of intense debate among policymakers and analysts.^{[32:4][34:1][33:2]}

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Did the USA succeefully achieve goal with Ukraine?

The USA’s support for Ukraine achieved some core goals, but key objectives remain only partially fulfilled as of late 2025. U.S. military aid significantly helped Ukraine defend itself and slow or repel Russian advances, especially in the early stages of the Russian invasion, and allowed Ukraine to remain a functioning, independent state. The USA, along with European allies, provided critical weapons, intelligence, and financial support, which played a pivotal role in Ukraine’s battlefield successes like defending Kyiv and Kharkiv.^{[35][36][37][38]}

Achievements of U.S. Policy

• U.S. support enabled Ukraine to prevent a quick Russian takeover and maintain most of its territory, frustrating Russian strategic objectives.^[36:1][38:1]
• Security assistance contributed to reforming Ukraine’s military, improving its ability to resist, and preserving Ukraine’s sovereignty.^[38:2][35:1]
• U.S. and allied aid helped sustain Ukraine’s civil society, government, and war effort for several years.^[39][38:3]

Unmet or Unfinished Goals

• By 2025, Russia has regained some battlefield momentum, and there is no clear victory or comprehensive peace; portions of eastern Ukraine remain under Russian occupation.^[36:2]
• U.S. aid was suspended in early 2025, and European allies took the lead in financial and military support, showing limits to long-term U.S. commitment and raising concerns about the future effectiveness of Ukraine’s resistance.^[40][36:3]
• The U.S. did not secure a lasting peace or establish Ukraine’s full territorial integrity—a key original objective remains unfulfilled.^[40:1][36:4]

Conclusion

While U.S. support successfully prevented Ukraine’s collapse and enabled it to defend against Russian aggression, it fell short of securing a decisive military or diplomatic outcome. The situation remains volatile, and while some goals were achieved, a stable, lasting peace with a fully restored Ukraine has not yet been realized.^{[36:5][40:2]
[41][42]}

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Since the USA is a democratic country, does it mean that the general voters should be held accountable for the crimes of the USA goverment?

In a democracy like the USA, voters have significant power and responsibility to hold government officials accountable through elections, but it is a complex issue whether they should be held directly responsible for government crimes or wrongdoing. The foundational idea in a representative democracy is that elected leaders are accountable to the public, and citizens can remove them from power if their actions do not reflect the voters’ values or the law.^[43][44][45]

Voter Accountability Principles

• In theory, voters are expected to oversee and evaluate the actions of their government and use their votes to reward or punish officials accordingly.^[45:1][43:1]
• Voting rights and reforms are considered essential tools for keeping government accountable to the people, making it harder for corrupt or criminal leaders to stay in power.^[44:1][45:2]
• However, voters are not directly responsible in a legal or criminal sense for the government’s actions. Accountability for crimes lies with the specific officials, leaders, or agencies who made the decisions and implemented the policies.^[43:2]

Practical and Ethical Considerations

• Barriers such as gerrymandering, voter suppression, and limited choices may reduce the effectiveness of voter accountability in practice, meaning the public cannot always meaningfully prevent or stop wrongdoing by the government.^[44:2][43:3]
• Ethical questions about collective responsibility are debated among scholars. Some suggest that citizens bear some moral responsibility insofar as they support or fail to oppose harmful government actions, especially in a system with broad political freedoms; others argue that practical powerlessness, lack of information, or manipulation by leaders limits individual culpability.^[45:3][43:4]

Legal Accountability

• Legally, responsibility for crimes such as war crimes, corruption, or human rights abuses is assigned to those who plan, order, or carry out such acts—not to the general population, even in a democracy.^[43:5][45:4]
• Most democracies aim to create mechanisms so that leaders—not ordinary voters—face prosecution or sanction for unlawful acts.

In summary, while voters in a democracy play a crucial role in holding the government accountable through elections and civic participation, they are not held legally responsible for the government’s crimes, although moral and political philosophers may debate broader ethical implications.^{[44:3][45:5][43:6]
[46][47][48][49][50][51]}

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If a politician promised that he/she would commit war crime to benefit the country, and he/she got elected, and actually committed that war crime, and lost the war, should the voters be held accountable for this war crime?

Voters in a democracy are generally not held legally or criminally responsible for the war crimes committed by leaders, even if those leaders were elected based on explicit promises to commit such acts. In international law and established democratic practice, direct accountability for criminal actions—such as war crimes—rests with those who plan, order, or carry out the acts, not with the electorate.^[52][53]

Legal and Moral Accountability

• Legally, war crimes are prosecuted against individuals who ordered, enabled, or conducted them—not ordinary voters—regardless of campaign promises or election results.^[53:1][52:1]
• Moral philosophers disagree about broader responsibility. Some argue that willingly electing leaders who openly support war crimes may entail some level of collective moral responsibility, especially if voters are aware and supportive of these actions. Others note that a wide gap usually exists between a politician’s rhetoric and the complex reality of government policy, making direct blame for voters both impractical and potentially unjust.^[52:2]

Democracy and Accountability Mechanisms

• In a healthy democracy, the essential mechanism for accountability is holding leaders responsible, either through courts, international tribunals, or political processes. Voters are expected to make informed choices, but this does not equate to criminal liability.^[53:2]
• Systems of checks and balances, free press, and independent judiciary are also designed to prevent or punish unlawful acts by leaders regardless of electoral outcomes.^[53:3]

In summary, even in the scenario where a politician openly promises war crimes and is elected, voters are not considered legally accountable for those crimes; the responsibility remains personal and specific to the leaders and actors involved. However, moral and ethical judgments about the choices of the electorate may be debated in academic or public discourse.^{[52:3][53:4]
[54][55][56][57][58][59]}

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Is this a way for a group of people to legally commit war crime? find a scapegoat and make him an elected official, then the war crime would only be traced to the scapegoat

Using an elected official as a “scapegoat” to shield a group from responsibility for war crimes would not provide legal protection or legitimacy for the group who planned or enabled the crimes. International law and most modern legal systems hold that individual criminal responsibility for serious crimes—such as war crimes—extends not only to those who directly commit the acts, but also to anyone who plans, orders, aids, or abets those acts.^[60][61]

Legal Principles

• The doctrine of “command responsibility” and “joint criminal enterprise” means that anyone who participates in the planning or execution of a war crime can be prosecuted, regardless of official title or whether they were the direct perpetrator.^[61:1]
• Electing an official does not shield those who conspired with them to commit crimes; if evidence shows broader involvement, co-conspirators or enablers could be held accountable.^[60:1]
• The fact that a leader is elected does not exempt them or their accomplices from prosecution under international law—democratic process does not legitimize war crimes, and prosecution can include government officials, military personnel, and private actors involved.^[61:2]

Practical and Ethical Issues

• While scapegoating is sometimes used to deflect attention or blame for policy failures or wrongdoing, it is not a reliable or legal way to protect all responsible parties from accountability.^[60:2][61:3]
• Investigations and prosecutions by international courts (like the International Criminal Court) often seek to identify entire networks behind atrocities, not just figureheads.

In summary, trying to make a single elected official the scapegoat for group-planned war crimes would not work as a legal protection scheme, and criminal responsibility would extend to all those who planned, ordered, or facilitated such crimes, regardless of their official status or how they attained office.^{[61:4][60:3]
[62][63][64][65][66][67][68][69][70]}

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but they are voters, you just said voters are not linked to war crimes

Voters, as a group, are not legally responsible for war crimes simply because they participated in an election or voted for a candidate who later committed such acts. Legal frameworks—both domestic and international—focus responsibility for war crimes on individuals who directly planned, ordered, enabled, or carried out those crimes. The act of voting is not a criminal act, even if the winning candidate later commits crimes in office. Elections express collective political will, but do not create legal culpability for all actions by government leaders.^[71]

Legal Distinction

• War crimes and similar serious offenses are prosecuted against the individuals or networks who executed or conspired in those acts, not the entire electorate.^[71:1]
• Being a voter or even knowingly voting for a candidate with a criminal agenda does not make one legally complicit in crimes carried out; legal systems separate the act of voting from the execution of criminal policy.^[71:2]

Political and Moral Responsibility

• While there is ongoing ethical debate about the moral responsibility of citizens in a democracy for supporting reprehensible leaders, this does not translate into legal accountability for war crimes. Moral and collective responsibility are broader, contested ideas, but not enforceable in courts as criminal liability.^[71:3]

Summary

In short, while voters shape the direction of a government, only those who participate in the planning or direct execution of illegal acts—like war crimes—face legal accountability. Voting for a candidate does not make one legally culpable for crimes committed by that official after taking office.^{[71:4]
[72][73][74][75][76][77][78][79][80]}

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but it is the voting process that enabled the politician to commit the war crime, how is it not an act of complicit in crime?

The legal concept of complicity in war crimes requires that a person knowingly and intentionally participated in, aided, abetted, or facilitated the crime in a meaningful way—mere voting, even for a candidate with criminal intentions, is not enough to meet this legal standard. For legal liability, there must be a direct, substantial contribution to the commission of the crime.^[81][82]

Key Legal Standards

• International and domestic criminal law: Complicity means intentionally helping, encouraging, or enabling a crime—simply participating in an election, even for a leader promising illicit acts, does not render all voters complicit. Criminal liability rests on tangible actions like planning, ordering, or materially supporting the crime, not on voting as an abstract act of political process.^[82:1][81:1]
• The Nürnberg Principles and modern jurisprudence specify that only those who provide “substantial contribution” or “direct and substantial assistance” to a crime can be prosecuted as accomplices.^[83][82:2]
• Voting for a politician—even one who later commits a war crime—does not constitute “aiding, abetting, or facilitating” in the legal sense required for criminal prosecution.^[82:3]

Policy and Moral Debate

• While voters may, in a moral sense, be criticized or held responsible in public discourse for enabling harmful leaders, this is distinct from legal complicity. Democracies draw a firm legal distinction between the act of casting a ballot and criminal aid or participation.^[84][82:4]

Summary

Legal systems worldwide separate the act of voting from the commission of criminal acts. To be complicit in war crimes requires more direct involvement than voting in a democratic process—the law targets those who enable, direct, or materially contribute to the crimes, not ordinary voters.^{[81:2][84:1][82:5]
[85][86][87][88][89][90]}

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why is voting not considered a substantial contribution?

Voting is not considered a substantial contribution to war crimes because, in both international and domestic law, legal complicity requires an intentional and direct contribution to the commission of a crime—such as planning, funding, supplying weapons, or otherwise materially enabling criminal acts. The act of voting in a democratic election is an indirect, collective action governed by political rights, not a specific, individualized act of support for a criminal enterprise.^[91][92]

Legal Criteria for Complicity

• Substantial Contribution Standard: Complicity hinges on a person’s specific actions that meaningfully assist or encourage a crime. This includes things like providing weapons or intelligence with intent to enable criminal acts.^[93][91:1]
• Intent and Knowledge: Legal systems require that the accomplice knowingly participate with criminal intent. Voting, even for a candidate with unlawful promises, does not meet this standard, as it is:
  • Dispersed across millions of individuals
  • Not specific to any single illegal act
  • Conducted in an environment where motives for voting are varied and cannot be presumed criminal.^[92:1]

Voting as Political Participation

• Casting a ballot is viewed as an exercise of civic duty and political expression, protected by law in democracies. It is not regarded as a material act furthering the commission of a war crime, because it neither directs nor provides a specific, effective means for the crime to occur.^[92:2]
• In contrast, acts like direct financing, weapons delivery, or military orders are prosecuted as complicity, because they tangibly “make the crime happen”.^[93:1][91:2]

Summary

Voting is not criminalized because it is not a direct or intentional act of participation in a specific crime. Legal systems worldwide draw a clear line between protected political participation and acts that materially contribute to illegal conduct.^{[91:3][92:3]
[94][95][96][97][98][99][100][101]}

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from your description, the voting system allows the society to repeatedly elect leaders that commit war crimes in the benefit of the voting society.

Your observation highlights a significant challenge in democratic systems: it is indeed possible for voters to repeatedly elect leaders who commit war crimes or other abuses, especially if those acts are perceived as serving national interests or are not fully known or acknowledged by the public. However, democracies differ from autocracies in that such leaders can be prosecuted, removed from office, or otherwise held to account after committing crimes.^{[102][103][104][105][106]}

Historical Context

• There are documented cases where democratically elected leaders have been indicted or tried for war crimes or serious abuses, such as leaders in Sudan, Serbia, and other countries.^{[107][103:1][108]}
• Democracies are not immune to electing leaders who engage in criminal conduct, but legal norms, free press, independent judiciaries, and civil society make eventual accountability more likely, even if delayed.^[104:1][109]

Limitations of the Voting System

• Voting gives societies collective influence, but accountability depends on transparency, education, rule of law, and prosecutorial independence—mechanisms that do not always function perfectly.^[106:1]
• Societies can elect or re-elect leaders despite knowledge (or suspicion) of their abuses when those actions are believed to be in the country’s benefit, or when propaganda and misinformation distort public understanding.^[105:1]

Democratic Response

• The possibility of after-the-fact prosecution and public accountability remains a strength of democracy—leaders in democratic systems have been charged and tried after leaving office, unlike many autocracies.^{[103:2][109:1]}
• The Nuremberg principles and the International Criminal Court reinforce that official positions, even those achieved democratically, do not excuse or protect against prosecution for international crimes.^{[108:1][107:1]}

In summary, democratic voting systems can, under some circumstances, result in the repeated election of leaders who commit crimes, but democracies also provide legal and political mechanisms for holding those leaders accountable—at least in principle—after the fact.^{[109:2][103:3][104:2]
[110][111]}

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is USA an example of such kind of democratic society? the public is well aware that every elected US president wage wars, and a lot of them turn out to be criminally wars.

The United States is widely discussed as an example of a democratic society where elected leaders have authorized or conducted military actions that have been heavily criticized—sometimes internationally—as potential war crimes or unlawful wars. The U.S. public is often aware that presidents engage in military interventions, and such interventions are frequently justified to the public as serving national interests or security.^{[112][113][114]}

U.S. Leaders and War Crimes

• All recent U.S. presidents, regardless of party, have overseen military actions that resulted in significant civilian casualties or have been accused by international observers of violating international law.^{[113:1][114:1][112:1]}
• Examples include drone strikes with civilian casualties (Obama, Trump, Biden), the Iraq War (Bush), support for proxy conflicts, detainee abuse, and controversial arms sales to partners accused of atrocities (multiple administrations).^[115][113:2]
• Despite these patterns, no U.S. president has been prosecuted for war crimes, in part due to legal protections, international politics, and bipartisan support for most major military campaigns.^{[113:3][115:1]}

Accountability Challenges

• There is substantial documentation and debate about the U.S. political system’s inability—or unwillingness—to prosecute its own leaders or senior officials for alleged crimes related to war or international law violations.^{[115:2][113:4]}
• While the public may be aware of these actions, the complexity of information, partisan media, and framing of military necessity often diffuse direct accountability, both for leaders and the voting populace.^[116][114:2]

Summary

The USA fits your description to a significant extent: it is a democracy where leaders repeatedly engage in controversial or arguably illegal wars, often with public knowledge, but rarely face prosecution or formal accountability for war crimes. This ongoing pattern raises enduring questions about democratic responsibility, legal enforcement, and public complicity.^{[114:3][113:5][115:3]
[117][118][119][120]}

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1. https://www.voanews.com/a/fact-check-us-arms-sales-to-taiwan-does-not-break-america-s-promise-to-china-/6994283.html ↩︎ ↩︎

2. https://chasfreeman.net/the-1981-82-sino-american-taiwan-arms-sales-negotiations/ ↩︎ ↩︎

3. https://www.cato.org/commentary/increase-arms-sales-taiwan ↩︎ ↩︎

4. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/us-conventional-arms-sales-taiwan-1980-2010 ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎

5. https://www.cfr.org/article/us-military-support-taiwan-five-charts ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎

6. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/should-the-united-states-change-its-policies-toward-taiwan/ ↩︎

7. https://en.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=1328&sms=273&s=121110 ↩︎

8. https://english.president.gov.tw/News/7041 ↩︎

9. https://interpret.csis.org/translations/adjustments-in-u-s-arms-sales-policy-toward-taiwan-characteristics-trends-and-implications/ ↩︎

10. https://uschinatoday.org/features/2009/05/07/getting-back-to-normal-the-u-s-taiwan-arms-sale-seven-months-later/ ↩︎

11. https://www.cato.org/commentary/time-rethink-arms-sales-taiwan ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎

12. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/should-the-united-states-change-its-policies-toward-taiwan/ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎

13. https://en.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=1328&sms=273&s=121110 ↩︎ ↩︎

14. https://www.cfr.org/article/us-military-support-taiwan-five-charts ↩︎

15. https://english.president.gov.tw/News/7041 ↩︎

16. https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202511/18/WS691c7075a310d6866eb2a251.html ↩︎

17. https://www.forumarmstrade.org/ustaiwan.html ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎

18. https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2711&context=parameters ↩︎

19. https://interpret.csis.org/translations/adjustments-in-u-s-arms-sales-policy-toward-taiwan-characteristics-trends-and-implications/ ↩︎

20. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-trump ↩︎

21. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3226431/taiwans-deal-buy-us-volcano-landmine-systems-sparks-controversy-over-safety-risk-and-international ↩︎

22. https://newbloommag.net/2023/03/16/us-arms-stockpiles-taiwan/ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎

23. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/21/fact-sheet-changes-to-u-s-anti-personnel-landmine-policy/ ↩︎ ↩︎

24. https://en.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=1329&s=99384 ↩︎ ↩︎

25. https://www.popsci.com/technology/us-selling-taiwan-volcano-mine-dispenser-systems/ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎

26. https://www.fcnl.org/updates/2022-07/issue-brief-us-policy-landmines ↩︎

27. https://www.forumarmstrade.org/ustaiwan.html ↩︎

28. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/19/us-sells-700m-nasams-missile-system-to-taiwan ↩︎

29. https://www.straitstimes.com/world/us-confirms-sale-of-700-million-air-defence-missile-system-to-taiwan ↩︎

30. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OPJYZwnYuSM ↩︎

31. https://www.cfr.org/article/us-military-support-taiwan-five-charts ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎

32. https://www.popsci.com/technology/us-selling-taiwan-volcano-mine-dispenser-systems/ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎

33. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/should-the-united-states-change-its-policies-toward-taiwan/ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎

34. https://www.cato.org/commentary/time-rethink-arms-sales-taiwan ↩︎ ↩︎

35. https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/the-surprising-success-of-u-s-military-aid-to-ukraine ↩︎ ↩︎

36. https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-us-aid-going-ukraine ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎

37. https://www.csis.org/analysis/can-ukraine-fight-without-us-aid-seven-questions-ask ↩︎

38. https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/new-analysis-economists-ukraine-cost-us-aid-ukraine-less-half-official-figures ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎

39. https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-political-military-affairs/releases/2025/01/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine ↩︎

40. https://www.kielinstitut.de/publications/news/ukraine-support-europe-largely-fills-the-us-aid-withdrawal-lead-byn-the-nordics-and-the-uk/ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎

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